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For a short period of time in the middle of the last century, at least 
in Europe, Wittgenstein was the measure of all things in philosophy and 
especially in the philosophy of mind. The private language argument 
had shown the conception of the mind going back to Descartes and 
Locke to be principally flawed – or so the consensus was. Mental 
phenomena are not essentially private, and there simply cannot be 
mental states without any observable criteria at all. Anyone who 
disagreed was in for a difficult time. Yet, only one or two decades later 
the discussion had moved on considerably. First, the identity theory 
overcame behaviourism. Second, functionalism superseded the identity 
theory, thereby paving the way for more specialist approaches such as 
Fodor’s representational theory of mind. Finally, a new, post-
Wittgensteinian orthodoxy developed with amazing swiftness. With 
hindsight, this seems a remarkable phenomenon in the sociology of 
philosophy. As interesting as it would be, I shall disregard the 
sociological side here. Instead, I am interested in the questions: What 
has changed? And, are there good reasons for these changes? 
These questions are difficult to answer, not least, because it is far  
from clear which position Wittgenstein himself held with regard to the 
mind-body problem. Even today, articles and books are being published 
in an attempt to come closer to answering this question; but 50 years 
after Wittgenstein’s death we are still far from a generally accepted 
consensus. Of course, this picture is painted a little bleakly: some points 
are clear – for instance Wittgenstein’s rejection of the picture of an  
inner world of the mind and an external world of material things,  
which pervades all areas of philosophy since early modern times. Ac- 
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cording to Descartes, the mind is an immaterial substance of its own  
– a res cogitans – and thinking, feeling and remembering are occur-
rences in this substance accessible only to this substance itself. The 
consequence of this picture is that the mind is private. Only the mind 
itself can know what happens within; others, at best, have indirect 
access through a kind of inductive inference. They have to infer from 
the person’s behaviour what goes on in a person’s mind. This, Wittgen-
stein says in a famous passage in the Philosophical Investigations, is 
complete nonsense: 
In what sense are my sensations private? – Well, only I can know whether  
I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is 
wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “to know” as it is 
normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often 
know when I am in pain. – Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with 
which I know it myself! – It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a 
joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps 
that I am in pain? (PI § 246) 
If the epistemic consequences of the Cartesian picture of the mind  
are nonsensical, the picture itself must be wrong: the mind is not  
private, but public. But what does this mean? The predominant view in 
the 50s and 60s was a view that one could call the “criteriological 
account”1. According to the proponents of this view Wittgenstein has 
shown by means of considerations on the meaning of linguistic 
expressions in general that there can be no mental states without 
behavioural criteria. Pain behaviour is not just a symptom of the mental 
state pain, but a criterion. That is to say, pain behaviour is corrigible 
evidence that somebody is in pain, but for semantic reasons it is, in a 
certain way, also sufficient evidence. For semantic reasons it is true that 
if a person shows this behaviour and there is no evidence to the 
contrary, then this person is in pain. There is ample evidence that 
Wittgenstein held this view. Consider for example this passage from the 
Blue Book: 
When we learnt the use of the phrase “so-and-so has toothache” we were 
pointed out certain kinds of behaviour of those who were said to have 
toothache. As an instance of these kinds of behaviour let us take holding your 
cheek. […] Now one may […] ask: “How do you know that he has got toothache 
when he holds his cheek?” The answer to this might be, “I say, he has toothache 
when he holds his cheek because I hold my cheek when I have toothache.” 
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But what if we went on asking: – “And why do you suppose that toothache 
corresponds to his holding his cheek just because your toothache corresponds 
to your holding your cheek?” You will be at a loss to answer this question, and 
find that here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to 
conventions. (Blue and Brown Books, 24)  
In other words: not all signs of the presence of pain can be mere 
symptoms; some must be criteria in the semantic sense, because 
otherwise we would have no basis for the application of the concept 
‘pain’. Obviously, this is exactly one of the points of the private 
language argument. However, the criteriological interpretation has been 
criticised in recent years, among other reasons, because it places 
Wittgenstein in great proximity to behaviourism, a theory which he 
explicitly rejected in many places. 
What may have been his reasons for this rejection? Perhaps, as 
Hanjo Glock suggests, that the behaviourist is still sticking too closely 
to the Cartesian picture by construing the mental after the image of the 
physical. 
Wittgenstein’s attack on the inner/outer dichotomy is often accused of reducing 
the inner to the outer, and thereby ignoring the most important aspects of hu-
man existence. Ironically, Wittgenstein in turn accuses the inner/outer 
conception of mistakenly assimilating the mental to the physical. It construes 
the relationship between mental phenomena and mental terms ‘on the model 
of’ material ‘object and designation’, and thereby turns the mind into a realm 
of mental entities, states, processes and events, which are just like their 
physical counterparts, only hidden and more ethereal […] [T]his tendency is 
fuelled by the Augustinian picture of language, which suggests that all words 
stand for objects, and all sentences describe something – if not physical 
entities, then entities of a different kind. (Glock 1996, 175) 
Indeed, there are a number of passages that suggest that it was 
Wittgenstein’s opinion that it is a fundamental error to construe the use 
of mental terms after the model of the use of physical language. He 
writes, for example, in the Philosophical Investigations: 
How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviourism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. So-
metime perhaps we shall know more about them – we think. But that is just what 
commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite 
concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive 
movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that  
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we thought quite innocent.) – And now the analogy which was to make us un-
derstand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncompre-
hended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had 
denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. (PI § 308) 
In the second part of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
touches again on his views on behaviourism: 
Then psychology treats of behaviour, not of the mind?  
What do psychologists record? – What do they observe? Isn’t it the behaviour 
of human beings, in particular their utterances? But these are not about behaviour. 
“I noticed that he was out of humour.” Is this a report about his behaviour or 
his state of mind? (“The sky looks threatening”: is this about the present or the 
future?) Both; not side-by-side, however, but about the one via the other. […] 
It is like the relation: physical object – sense-impressions. Here we have two 
different language-games and a complicated relation between them. – If you 
try to reduce their relations to a simple formula you go wrong. (PI, 179 f.) 
In my eyes, this remark is rather enigmatic. One thing is clear, how-
ever: for Wittgenstein the difference between speaking-of-behaviour  
and speaking-of-mental-states is similar to the difference of speaking-of-
physical-objects and speaking-of-sense-impressions. Here we have  
two different language games, even if these language games – as he 
explicitly points out – are closely linked. But, and this is very regretta-
ble, Wittgenstein says very little about how the language game of talk-
ing about the mental really works and how it differs from speaking 
about behaviour and from other more physical language games. The 
situation gets even more confusing because in the Remarks on the Phi-
losophy of Psychology I and in Zettel we find a rather peculiar passage, 
according to which Wittgenstein sees the level of psychology and that of 
physiology as completely separate. 
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the 
brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible 
to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or 
write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and 
correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should […] this order 
not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The case would be like the following – 
certain kinds of plants multiply by seed, so that a seed always produces a plant 
of the same kind as that from which it was produced – but nothing in the seed 
corresponds to the plant which comes from it; so that it is impossible to infer 
the properties or structure of the plant from those of the seed that it comes out 
of […] [T]here is no reason why this should not really hold for our thoughts, 
and hence for our talking and writing. […] (RPPI 903; see Z 608) 
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I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I 
remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this 
remembering in my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever 
it may be, be stored-up there in any form? Why must a trace have been left 
behind? Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no 
physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concepts of causality 
then it is high time they were upset. (RPPI 905; see Z 610) 
If we read this passage from today’s perspective, Wittgenstein 
seems to say no more and no less than that the thesis of the emergent 
nature of mental phenomena appears extremely plausible to him2.  
To that end he is prepared to allow a causality between mental 
phenomena that is not mediated by physiological processes, even if this 
brings the concurrent danger that it may appear to count in favour of 
classical mind-body dualism. 
The prejudice in favour of psycho-physical parallelism is also a fruit of the 
primitive conception of grammar. For when one admits a causality between 
psychological phenomena, which is not mediated physiologically, one fancies 
that in doing so one is making an admission of the existence of a soul 
alongside the body, a ghostly mental nature. (RPPI 906; see Z 611) 
Of course, all these quotations come from texts written at very 
different times and occasions. But even if this is so, it can not be 
disputed that we do not find a coherent account of the relations and the 
differences between the mental and the physical, between the use of 
mental terms and the use of physical terms in Wittgenstein’s writings. 
We do find a straightforward rejection of the idea that the mind is a 
private inner theatre, and we also find hints in direction of the idea that 
there is a significant difference between the use of the mental and the 
physical vocabulary. At least, many philosophers understood 
Wittgenstein this way. And, what is more, in my view a large part of 
post-Wittgensteinian philosophy can be conceived of as an attempt to 
spell out the idea of two levels or two language games. 
One reason may have been that this idea seems to allow the 
dissolution of the mind-body problem. This problem is widely held to be 
the problem “of accounting for the place of mind in a world that is 
essentially physical”3. At least at first sight there seem to be mental  
items in the world: pains and thoughts, colour sensations and wishes, 
consciousness and perhaps even souls. How is this realm of the mental  
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related to the realm of the physical? Are mental items in fact not so 
different, but only a special kind of physical items? Or does the mental 
constitute a special realm of non-physical entities that nonetheless 
causally interact with the physical? Wittgenstein’s views seem to allow 
the answer: All these questions are ill conceived. One only has to notice 
that the mental language does work in a way very different from that of 
the physical language. Mental terms do not denote special states or 
processes in the way physical terms denote physical states or processes. 
Indeed, they do not denote at all. And this means that there simply are 
no mental items about which we can reasonably ask how they fit into an 
essentially physical world. 
This attractive feature of Wittgenstein’s views seems to have 
inspired for example Gilbert Ryle whose work may also be understood 
as an attempt to elaborate Wittgenstein’s two languages account4. To be 
sure, The Concept of Mind was published four years before the 
Philosophical Investigations. However, Ryle’s thoughts are so similar to 
the thoughts of the late Wittgenstein, and he was so much influenced by 
Wittgenstein through conversations and lecture-notes that I do not 
hesitate to treat Ryle as a Wittgensteinian here. Ryle, however, seems to 
have been concerned with a particular aspect of the mind-body problem 
– the question of how the mind can causally interact with the body. He 
also tries to dissolve this problem by a semantic argument. According to 
Ryle, mental terms refer to dispositions and not to events, and, that is, 
not to possible causes. The problem of how the mind causally interacts 
with the body simply disappears when we only acknowledge that mental 
explanations are dispositional explanations. I shall come back to this 
issue soon. But first I would like to say a few words on the general 
outline of Ryle’s argument. 
To begin with, Ryle, too, emphatically rejects the concept of mind 
that has become pervasive since early modern times. For Ryle, too, it is 
absurd to assume a Cartesian theatre, in which mental objects abound 
and mental occurrences take place, that only the mind knows  
about – occurrences, which moreover interact causally with each other 
and with occurrences in the physical world. According to Ryle, this 
assumption rests on one big misunderstanding, or, to put it more pre-
cisely, it rests on a category mistake. This mistake can briefly be cha-
racterised like this: Cartesians, but not only Cartesians, assume that  
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mental expressions such as ‘to remember’, ‘to think’, ‘to perceive’, ‘to 
believe’ and ‘to want’ refer to (hidden) internal occurrences within a 
person’s mind, which cause the person’s outward behaviour. In reality 
however, according to Ryle, we do not employ these expressions to refer 
to some ‘shadow actions’, which are hidden antecedents of the overt 
behaviour. Instead we use the mental expressions to characterise the 
publicly observable actions in a different way. The mentalist thinks 
mental phenomena consist in enigmatic occurrences behind the 
observable actions, while in reality mental phenomena are nothing but a 
manner of organisation of these actions.  
Ryle supports his view that mental expressions do not refer to 
hidden inner occurrences – among other arguments – with an analysis of 
intelligent and voluntary actions. His opponent, the mentalist, analyses 
intelligent, or voluntary behaviour like this: 
–  an action is intelligent if and only if it has been caused by a 
corresponding thought; 
– an action is voluntary if and only if it has been caused by a 
corresponding act of the will. 
However, when we consider carefully under which circumstances 
we really call an action ‘intelligent’, a completely different picture 
emerges. For, normally, we would say that someone acts intelligently if 
– he normally does what he does correctly, well and successfully and 
if 
– he is able to discover a mistake in his way of proceeding and to 
eliminate it, if he is able to repeat successes and improve on them, 
if he is able to learn from the example of others etc. 
That is to say, a closer consideration of our actual use of language 
shows that we do not call an action intelligent if we can trace it back to a 
hidden inner process, but rather if the action does not stand alone, but is 
part of a pattern of actions and abilities. 
‘Willing’, too, according to Ryle, is certainly not a verb that we use 
to refer to occurrences (acts of the will); for if this were the case, these 
occurrences would have to be dateable and countable. However: 
No one ever says such things as that at 10 a.m. he was occupied in willing this 
or that, or that he performed five quick and easy volitions and two slow and 
difficult volitions between midday and lunch-time. An accused person may  
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admit or deny that he did something, or that he did it on purpose, but he never 
admits or denies having willed. Nor do the judge and jury require to be 
satisfied by evidence, which in the nature of the case could never be adduced, 
that a volition preceded the pulling of the trigger. (Ryle 1963, 63) 
Moreover: What properties could acts of the will have? Can we 
perform them fast or slowly? Can we do more than one at the same 
time? Can we interrupt an act of will and later pick it up where we left 
it? The impossibility of finding answers to these questions shows very 
clearly that in our everyday understanding ‘willing’ does not stand for 
occurrences or actions. However, what does it stand for? 
Ryle advocates carefully considering our everyday use of language. 
It shows that we normally use the adjectives ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’ 
when we are interested in the question of whether a mistake deserves 
reproach. A sailor is asked to tie a reef-knot, but he ties a granny-knot. 
A pupil arrives late for school. These are typical cases in which we ask 
whether the respective actions were voluntary or not. It depends upon 
the answer to this question whether we reprimand the sailor or the pupil 
or even punish them. The decisive question is whether the person who 
committed the mistake could have avoided it. This, in turn, depends 
upon whether he or she had the knowledge and the ability to carry out 
the action properly, and whether external circumstances have prevented 
him or her from correctly carrying it out. However, both can be detected 
without recourse to some mysterious acts of will. 
Therefore, voluntary actions, contrary to the official character-
risation, are better analysed thus: 
– a mistaken (wrong) action is voluntary if and only if the agent 
possesses the knowledge and the ability to perform the action 
correctly and if he or she is not prevented by external 
circumstances from the correct performance of the action. 
The analysis of intelligent actions as well as the analysis of 
voluntary actions therefore shows that the official doctrine is mistaken. 
Both types of actions are not characterised by the ‘fact’ that they are 
caused by hidden internal events in the agent’s mind. 
However, if this is so, the question arises how this mistaken 
impression could have come about. Why are we so prone to make ca- 
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tegory mistakes when thinking about the mind? Why do we assume that 
mental expressions refer to events that take place inside people’s heads? 
According to Ryle, a central reason for the mistaken views of the 
official doctrine lies in the fact that the official doctrine construes 
mental explanations as causal explanations, and therefore views mental 
phenomena as (hidden) causes. In Ryle’s view, however, mental states 
are really dispositions and hence mental explanations dispositional 
explanations. 
Ryle provides a famous analysis of the sentence “He boasted from 
vanity.” 
The statement “he boasted from vanity” ought, on one view, to be construed as 
saying that “he boasted and the cause of his boasting was the occurrence in 
him of a particular feeling or impulse of vanity”. On the other view, it is to be 
construed as saying “he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so 
satisfies the law-like proposition that whenever he finds a chance of securing 
the admiration and envy of others, he does whatever he thinks will produce 
this admiration and envy.” (Ryle 1963, 87) 
According to Ryle, it is perfectly obvious that the first analysis is 
totally absurd. When we ask to which type of explanation the statement 
“he passed his neighbour the salt from politeness” belongs, it is imme-
diately obvious that the causal analysis is not tenable. This is so because 
a polite person is one who has the disposition not to jump the queue, to 
let others pass before him, to help without being asked, to avoid making 
tactless remarks, not to make his hosts uncomfortable through 
inappropriate dress or inappropriate behaviour, and so forth. Further-
more, the dispositional character of this explanation also shows itself 
from the fact that it requires supplementing by a causal explanation. 
But the general fact that a person is disposed to act in such and such ways in 
such and such circumstances does not by itself account for his doing a par-
ticular thing at a particular moment; any more than the fact that the glass was 
brittle accounts for its fracture at 10 p.m. As the impact of the stone at 10 p.m. 
caused the glass to break, so some antecedent of an action causes or occasions 
the agent to perform it when and where he does so. For example, a man passes 
his neighbour the salt from politeness; but his politeness is merely his 
inclination to pass the salt when it is wanted, as well as to perform a thousand 
other courtesies of the same general kind. So besides the question “for what 
reason did he pass the salt?” there is the quite different question “what made 
him pass the salt at that moment to that neighbour?” This question is probably 
answered by “he heard his neighbour ask for it”, or “he noticed his neighbour’s 
eye wandering over the table”, or something of the sort. (Ryle 1963, 109) 
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The emerging picture is this: According to Ryle, dispositional 
statements like “this plane is brittle” or “John is polite” are encapsulated 
laws or law-like statements. Within the context of explanation 
dispositional statements, therefore, never express antecedent conditions 
and, that is, causes. Their role is the role of statements expressing laws. 
This, in turn, implies that dispositional explanations are, in a sense, 
incomplete. In addition to the relevant dispositions, i.e. laws, we also 
need to know the relevant antecedent conditions and, that is, the causes 
of the action to be explained. 
In Ryle’s eyes there can be no doubt that the explanation “he 
passed his neighbour the salt from politeness” – just as the explanation 
“he boasted from vanity” – is, in this sense, a dispositional explanation. 
And this, in his view, implies that the mental phenomena, to which the 
overt behaviour is traced back in these explanations, are not mysterious 
inner processes in the agent’s mind, but dispositional properties, which 
are just as publicly accessible as are the dispositions of brittleness or of 
being soluble in water. 
With this dispositional analysis Ryle aims at the same thing as with 
his alternative analyses of intelligent and voluntary behaviour. Firstly, 
he wishes to show that mental expressions do not refer to hidden inner 
occurrences in a person’s mind, but to circumstances whose public 
observability is beyond doubt. Secondly, he wants to show that mental 
concepts as dispositional concepts do not refer to the causes of actions 
and that mental explanations, therefore, never compete for instance with 
physiological explanations.  
A closer look reveals, however, that in Ryle’s considerations there 
are at least two accounts of what the use of mental vocabulary amounts 
to: the pattern account and the dispositional account. According to the 
pattern account using mental terms to describe and explain behaviour is 
nothing but regarding the behaviour as an integral part of a wider pattern 
of behaviour and capacities. The dispositional account is more 
straightforward. According to the dispositional account, in using mental 
concepts we do nothing but ascribe certain behavioural dispositions and 
capacities to the person in question. 
In the history of Ryle reception the dispositional account was 
obviously the more prominent one. However, it has been precisely this 
aspect of Ryle’s thought that proved to be particularly vulnerable to 
objections. This is so for three reasons:  
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(1) Dispositional predicates are not just used when we characterise a 
person’s mental life; they are just as much at home in the 
vocabulary of the natural sciences. Mass or weight, for instance, 
are classical examples of dispositions. That an object has the 
weight of 10 kp means, among other things, that if placed on scales 
it will generate a certain movement of the pointer. That an object 
has the mass of 10 kg means, among other things, that it 
experiences a certain amount of acceleration if a certain force acts 
upon it. Furthermore, natural dispositions are multi-track, too – i.e., 
they are characterised not just by one occasion-reaction pair but by 
quite a number of these pairs. Therefore, the dispositional account 
is not very helpful when we are trying to draw the line between the 
mental language game and the physical language game. At most, 
we can distinguish between the language games of events and the 
language games of dispositions in this way; this distinction, 
however, stands in an orthogonal relation to that between the 
mental and the physical language game. 
(2) Ryle’s thesis that a categorical difference exists between 
dispositional explanations and causal explanations, was highly 
controversial from the outset. Let us just listen to one of the voices 
of the diverse chorus of critical contributions to this question.  
[…] actually, it is a mistake to suppose that only events may be properly spoken 
of as causes, for we frequently refer to states, dispositional properties and even 
the failure of events to occur as causes. For example, given appropriate circum-
stances, we might speak of a bent rail, an icy track or the failure of the brake-
man to signal as the cause of a given train accident. (Gean 1965/1966, 677) 
It is possible that Ryle might have felt vindicated in his view 
through Davidson’s thoughts on the concept of causality according 
to which the relata of causal relations are events and nothing else. 
However, many doubts remain. 
(3) The strongest argument against Ryle’s dispositional account arose 
from developments in the theory of scientific concept formation 
around that time. As early as 1936/1937 in his paper “Testability 
and Meaning” Carnap broke with the old thesis of Logical Empi-
ricism that all scientific concepts have to be definable exclusively 
in observation terms and logical vocabulary. It was the dispo-
sitional terms that had been the downfall of this thesis. Carnap  
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therefore suggested analysing the recalcitrant dispositional 
concepts by means of so-called reduction sentences. In the final 
consequence, however, this suggestion proved to be only the first 
step to a complete dissolution of the empiricist criterion of mean-
ing. Once the step was taken, the view gained hold that most 
concepts of scientific interest could not be defined in purely obser-
vational terms or even be adequately analysed by means of redu-
ction sentences. Rather, according to the new insight, central con-
cepts such as length, mass, temperature and charge are theoretical 
concepts, which receive their meaning on the one hand through 
their relations to other theoretical concepts and on the other hand 
through a number of correspondence rules, which – rather loosely – 
connect certain theoretical concepts with observational terms.  
An early canonical formulation of this new view can be found in 
Hempel’s Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical 
Science, which was published in 1952. 
After this theory, which Carnap endorsed too, had gained fast 
acceptance, it was natural to conceive of mental terms no longer as 
dispositional predicates, but also as theoretical terms – especially so, 
since Ryle had already spoken of multi-track dispositions in this context. 
This view was defended by, e.g., Fodor and Chihara as well as by 
Brandt and Kim, who immediately drew a conclusion that is very 
uncomfortable for the dispositional account: if mental concepts really 
are theoretical concepts, then they are indeed not different from the 
concepts of natural science and everything suggests that mental 
explanations are completely normal causal explanations much like “the 
iron glowed red because it was heated to 750° C” or “this piece of iron 
attracts iron filings because it is magnetic”. In other words, if mental 
concepts really are theoretical concepts, then statements like “John is 
angry” are not encapsulated laws or law-like statements, but statements 
that express antecedent conditions – and that is, causes – of actions. 
This conclusion was strongly supported by the resurrection of 
realism going back to Carnap’s and Tarski’s work on pure semantics. 
Actually, this major shift in the fundamental ideas of Logical Empiri-
cism also took place about 1950. Physical objects were no longer re- 
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garded as logical constructs out of  sense data and unobservable states 
and properties no longer as logical constructs out of observables. 
Physical objects and unobservable states and properties were again 
considered as perfectly real though not given. In his article “The Mind-
Body Problem in the Development of Logical Empiricism” Herbert 
Feigl writes5:  
The slogan of Vienna Logical Positivism: “The meaning of a  statement is the 
method of its verification”;  and the slogan of Bridgman’s operationism: “A 
concept is synonymous with the set of operations [which determine its 
applications]” were excellent preventives of the transcendent type of 
metaphysical speculations. […] Logical empiricism in its later development, 
however, had to replace these radical principles by more conservative ones. … 
[T]he meaning of scientific statements cannot in general be identified with 
their confirming evidence. […] For a […] very simple example we may refer 
to the concept of the temperature of a body. As ordinary and scientific 
commonsense […] would put it, thermometer (or pyrometer) readings, 
spectroscopic findings, and other types of measurement merely indicate 
something about the body in question, namely the intensity of heat which is a 
state of that body. No matter whether this heat intensity is construed in terms 
of classical (macro-) thermodynamics or in terms of statistical (micro- or 
molecular) thermodynamics, it is in any case only evidenced by but not 
identical with those indications. Similarly for psychology: The overt 
symptoms and behavior that indicate an emotion, like e.g., anxiety, are 
confirmable and measurable in terms of skin-temperature, endocrine 
secretions, psychogalvanic reflexes, verbal responses, etc. but must not be 
confused with the emotion itself. Generally, the “theoretical constructs,” i.e., 
the hypothetically assumed entities of the sciences cannot be identified with 
(i.e., explicitly defined in terms of) concepts which apply to the directly 
perceptible facts as they are manifest in the contexts of ordinary observation or 
of experimental operations. (Feigl 1950a, 617f.) 
One page later Feigl continues:  
The realistic correction of positivism consists in the identification of meaning 
with factual reference. This conforms well with customary usage according to 
which a statement means a state of affairs; and is true if that state of affairs is 
fulfilled (“is real,” “exists”). This is the obvious grammar of “meaning,” 
“truth,” and “reality.”  (Feigl 1950a, 619) 
Feigl could have added: According to customary usage, even the 
meaning of predicates as ‘temperature’ and ‘pain’ cannot be identified 
with the methods we use in trying to find out what temperature a body 
has or whether a person is in pain. Even these predicates refer – to the 
internal state of a body or the mental state of a person which are 
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“evidenced by but not identical with” thermometer readings or certain 
symptoms and ways to behave6.  
Perhaps these considerations contributed to the fact that other 
authors preferred the pattern account, which, as already mentioned, can 
also be found in Ryle. As early as the 50s and 60s of the last century 
Melden formulated thoughts in this direction. But, as far as I know, this 
account was only thoroughly spelled out by Eike von Savigny in his 
interpretation of the philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations. 
Central to this interpretation is the thesis that with regard to mental 
states it is not only the behaviour of the person who has the mental state 
in question that counts, but also the behaviour of the members of the 
society in which this person lives. Von Savigny believes that 
Wittgenstein held the following view: 
The fact that someone imagines something, expects something, wishes 
something, feels something, thinks of something or intends to do something 
etc. does not concern that person in isolation. Rather, this fact consists in that 
the patterns of this person’s individual behaviour are in a certain way 
embedded in the pattern of the social behaviour of the community to which he 
belongs. (von Savigny 1994, 10 – italics mine) 
Let us suppose someone has a headache and he displays the 
corresponding behaviour: he tries to hold his head still, he presses his 
hands against his temples, cools the forehead with a wet cloth and retires 
to a dark room. But not only that, his fellow humans, too, react in a way 
that we are used to: they offer him aspirin, they slink around noiselessly, 
they show sympathy towards him etc. This person is in pain. Let us now 
consider someone who behaves in exactly the same way as this person, 
but his environment reacts in a completely different manner: 
Moaning surprises the people; one does not receive any aspirin, and nobody 
calls the doctor. What we regard as pain behaviour, would there be treated as if 
the people were affected by some passing peculiarity. Their behaviour irritates 
the others, but they put up with it. The person with the headache has not 
changed in himself. (von Savigny 1994, 11f) 
According to von Savigny, Wittgenstein would say, relative to this 
second environment, that the person no longer has a headache. That 
someone has a headache means that his own behaviour shows a certain 
pattern, and that the reactions of his fellow humans have  
a certain pattern. The extreme – and in my eyes very implausible – ex- 
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ternalism of this view does not have to concern us here since the basic 
ideas of the pattern account may well be separated from it. For our 
purposes it is only important that according to the pattern account the 
following is true: 
– If one says that a person is in pain, one does not say that she is in 
any particular inner state, but that this person’s behaviour (and the 
behaviour of his fellow humans) has a certain pattern. 
– If one says a person is holding her cheek because she has a 
toothache, one does not causally explain this behaviour by tracing 
it back to a cause – the state of pain – but rather one explains this 
behaviour by pointing out that it forms part of a certain pattern of 
behaviour. 
– If one says that a person simulates pain, one says that the same 
behaviour – holding one’s cheek – for this person is embedded in a 
different pattern of behaviour. (An actor who acts being in pain, 
under certain circumstances behaves differently from someone who 
really is in pain.) If the same behaviour is embedded in exactly the 
same pattern of behaviour, it does not make sense to say in one 
case that the person is in pain and in the other she is not. 
Let us recapitulate here. Wittgensteinians and the proponents of the 
new orthodoxy agree in one point – their rejection of Cartesianism. The 
mind is not a non-material substance and the mental is not an inner 
world of occurrences to which only the mind itself has access. Mental 
terms such as ‘to remember’, ‘to think’, ‘to perceive’, ‘to believe’ and 
‘to want’ do not refer to hidden occurrences inside a person or inside a 
person’s mind. The mental is just as public as the physical. However, 
here the agreement ends. For the proponents of the new orthodoxy spell 
out the rejection of Cartesianism differently from the Wittgensteinians. 
For the new orthodoxy the mental is public because mental concepts are 
theoretical concepts – concepts with which we ascribe theoretical 
properties or states to persons and which – as concepts – have the same 
status as the concepts ‘is magnetic’ or ‘has a mass of 10 kg’. Even if in 
mental explanations the behaviour of persons is not traced back to 
hidden mental occurrences, these explanations are every bit as causal as 
the corresponding physical explanations. 
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The characteristic view of most Wittgensteinians on the other hand 
is that this picture is fundamentally wrong. Mental expressions do not 
refer to any states – not even to theoretical ones. By means of mental 
expressions we characterise persons whose behaviour shows a certain 
pattern; but with these expressions we do not ascribe states to these 
persons which give rise to these patterns. For this reason, mental 
explanations are certainly not causal explanations. Given these views it 
is no wonder that the battleground for the fight between 
Wittgensteinians and the proponents of the new orthodoxy became the 
question of whether mental explanations are causal explanations or 
explanations of a completely different kind. What were the reasons 
which the proponents of the new orthodoxy put forward for their case? 
To start with: Wittgensteinians who are committed to the pattern 
account claim that people who are in pain show a very specific beha-
viour. But they do not say anything about the causes of this behaviour; 
sometimes it even seems as if they regard even asking the question of 
the cause as illegitimate or nonsense. Prima facie, however, nothing 
counts against the view that pain behaviour has a cause, too. And don’t 
we say “He is holding his cheek because he is in pain”? So what seems 
more natural than to assume that with the expression ‘pain’ we do not 
refer to a pattern of behaviour, but to the cause of this behaviour? 
Let us consider the parallel physical case of being magnetic. The 
behaviour of magnetic objects also forms a characteristic pattern: they 
attract iron filings in their proximity and induce an electrical current in 
coils which they pass through, the needle of a compass near them tends 
to point in their direction etc. However, when we say of an object a that 
it is magnetic then we thereby do not say that a shows the behaviour that 
is characteristic of magnetic objects, but that it has the property that is 
causally responsible for this pattern of behaviour. Why should this case 
differ so fundamentally from the case of pain? 
Secondly, even proponents of the new orthodoxy do not deny  
that there is a relatively close relationship between mental states and 
typical behaviours. But they point out that it is simply not the case that 
all persons who are in pain show the same behavioural pattern. 
Compare, e.g., a person who cuts her finger during the usual morning 
toilet with a person who cuts her finger while hiding in a cave to escape 
her persecutors. The respective behaviour will be as different  
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as you can imagine. The simple explanation for this is straight forward: 
Pain causes behaviour, but it does not do so in isolation, but only in the 
context of the respective (relevant) beliefs, wishes, ideological attitudes 
etc. Thus, in the context of different mental states pain may give rise to 
different patterns of behaviour. 
Thirdly, pain itself can obviously be causally influenced in a 
multitude of ways. On the one hand pains are caused – through stabbing 
or beating, too much alcohol or muscle cramps and many other things. 
On the other hand, one can causally fight pain – through painkillers, 
through a cold compress, sometimes through warming the affected part, 
through acupuncture or through relaxation techniques etc. How can a 
proponent of the pattern account integrate this? Only by claiming that 
stabbings, beatings or too much alcohol causally lead to the person 
showing the pattern of behaviour characteristic of pain, and that 
painkillers, a cold compress on the forehead or acupuncture causally 
lead to the person ceasing to display this behaviour. This seems at least 
implausible. Causing pain is something different from causing pain 
behaviour, and fighting pain causally is something different from 
preventing pain behaviour. If pain was nothing but a certain pattern of 
behaviour people should get rid of their pain by being paralysed7. 
Remember that in anaesthesia usually three different kinds of drugs are 
used: one that induces unconsciousness, another by which the muscles 
get paralysed, and, finally, a third against pain. On the pattern account it 
is completely incomprehensible what additional role the third kind of 
drug is supposed to play.  
The strongest argument for the new orthodoxy, however, flows 
from the direct analysis of mental explanations. At least if one follows 
Mackie’s or Lewis’ considerations, these have exactly the features  
that are characteristic of causal explanations. For Mackie a cause  
of an effect e is, at least in principle, an INUS condition for e – an in-
sufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary 
but sufficient for e8. And indeed, if someone says “John is holding his 
cheek because he has a strong toothache”, we accept this explanation 
only if we are convinced that the toothache together with other con-
ditions is sufficient for John’s holding his cheek and if we furthermore 
believe that John would not hold his cheek if he had no toothache.  
If we learn that John would hold his cheek even if he had no ache  
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whatsoever simply because someone told him to do so, we would 
immediately reject the explanation given. This also is in complete 
accordance with David Lewis’ counterfactual account of causation9.  
Moreover, causal explanations provide an answer to the question of 
why a certain event took place at all. Pattern explanations, however, are 
not suited to this job. If saying “John is holding his cheek because he 
has a strong toothache” would just mean “John is holding his cheek, and 
this behaviour is part of a certain behavioural pattern characteristic of 
pain” then, after this explanation, we would still not know why John is 
holding his cheek, because the explanation remains silent on the 
question what leads to John showing this behavioural pattern. Mental 
explanations, however, do tell us why a person behaves the way he or 
she does. If I learn that John crossed the road in order to buy something 
at the grocer’s, then I also learn why John did exactly this and not 
something else, that is to say, I learn why this behaviour took place at 
all. If the explanation given were a pattern explanation, I would not 
learn this. Hence, by simple counterposition, this explanation is 
obviously a causal and not a pattern explanation. 
Resorting to the logical connection argument does not help here. 
As early as in the 60s it was shown with a great number of arguments 
that the logical connection argument is neither correct nor based on true 
premises. Davidson, for instance, has demonstrated convincingly that 
logical relations do not obtain between events, but between descriptions 
of events, and that for any two events one can always find descriptions 
that let them appear logically dependent as well as descriptions that 
make them logically independent. If c is the cause of e, c can always be 
described by the expression ‘the cause of e’, but of course this does not 
render the sentence “the cause of e is the cause of e” false. On the other 
hand, the considerations concerning the theoretical character of mental 
expressions have made especially clear that there is a connection that 
obtains between the mental states and the behaviour that they are meant 
to explain, but that this connection is by no means so close that it would 
preclude a causal relationship. And anyway: even if by definition the 
expression “streptococci infection” meant “infection caused by 
streptococci”, this would not render false the sentence “Streptococci 
infections are caused by streptococci”.  
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To sum up. It seems to me that in the dispute about the causal 
character of mental explanations at the end of the 60s and the beginning 
of the 70s the causalists clearly won the day. At least, this is how it 
appears among the academic public. Further, it seems to me that it was 
precisely this that has permitted the new orthodoxy to prevail so quickly 
over Wittgensteinianism. However, we should not forget to realise the 
consequences the most remarkable of which consists in the fact that the 
mind-body problem is on the agenda again. Maybe the question of 
whether there are mental things like souls or other spooky stuff is 
obsolete even now. But if mental properties are pretty normal and 
seemingly causally efficacious properties we cannot ignore the question 
of how these properties fit into an essentially physical world. And that is 
exactly the question which has been addressed by most of the work in 
the philosophy of mind in the last decades.  
In my mind, we should also acknowledge that we really have made 
some progress here, at least in understanding the question itself. 
However, in the mid-70s something began to happen within the 
framework of the new orthodoxy which could well be regarded as a 
return to Cartesianism. The starting point was Thomas Nagel’s seminal 
paper “What is it like to be a bat?”. The considerations of Nagel, 
Jackson, Levine, Chalmers10 and many others all seem to point to the 
same result, namely, that at least phenomenal states have characteristic 
features that in the last consequence are not public, since they are 
neither tied to typical behaviours nor to causal roles. The idea of the 
philosophical zombie was born – the idea of a being that in all situations 
says exactly the same as I say, and does exactly the same as I do, but 
whose phenomenal states are – on this assumption – either connected 
with radically different qualia or with none at all. 
It seems to me that those who claim that philosophical zombies are 
possible have strayed a step too far from Wittgensteinianism. For this 
assumption has a number of consequences that cast doubt on its 
coherence. One of these consequences has been very clearly spelled out 
by Levine himself in his 1997 paper “Recent Work on Consciousness”. 
Suppose, there is a creature that has the same functional  
structure as me, but whose functional states are not connected with any  
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qualia. Suppose this creature is a functional zombie. According to the 
assumption, there are states within this creature – let’s call him 
‘Zansgar’ – that play the same causal role as my sensations; but not only 
that, in this creature there are even states that play the same causal role 
as the beliefs that I have with regard to my sensations. Let us call these 
states Z-beliefs. Obviously, notwithstanding the differences, there is a 
great deal of similarity between my beliefs and Zansgar’s Z-beliefs. 
Zansgar’s Z-beliefs for example will make him say about himself: “Of 
course my phenomenal states are accompanied by certain qualitative ex-
periences”, even if this is false according to the assumption. Let us 
assume further, that the states through which Zansgar’s Z-sensations are 
realised, are one-by-one replaced by states which not only play the right 
causal roles, but also are accompanied by the qualia belonging to that 
state. Would Zansgar notice any difference? Or Z-notice a difference? 
This does not seem to be the case since there is no change in the causal 
roles of his states. But how can one say under these circumstances that 
there is a significant difference between Zansgar and me? After all, by 
the reverse process I could be changed into Zansgar – without noticing 
anything. 
What’s going on? The very intuitive stance, the first-person point of view, that 
fuelled the pro-zombie intuition, seems now to be undermining it. On the one 
hand, from within I seem aware of a feature of mental life whose absence I can 
so clearly conceive of in another. Yet, allowing for that absence in another 
seems to open up the possibility that its presence or absence makes no 
discernible difference, and that includes no discernible difference to me. 
(Levine 1997, 385) 
If this is the case and there is no discernible difference whether a 
certain functional state is accompanied by a certain qualitative 
experience or not, how could it make sense to distinguish between 
functional states with and without this experiential quality? This truly 
seems to be an example of the Wittgensteinian wheel that is not part of 
the mechanism11.  
So, there are good reasons for following the new orthodoxy insofar 
as it holds the view that speaking about the mental is not different  
as a matter of principle from speaking about the physical and that 
therefore mental explanations can be regarded as causal explanations. 
However, one should become sceptical if the Cartesian picture of the 
mind creeps in through the back door. Wittgenstein’s Anticartesianism 
and that of his followers is an achievement we should not fall behind.   
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